Abstract-This paper introduces compositional time Petri net (CTPN) models. A CTPN is a modularized time Petri net (TPN), which is composed of components and connectors. The paper also proposes a set of component-level reduction rules for TPNs. Each of these reduction rules transforms a TPN component to a very simple one while maintaining the net's external observable timing properties. Consequently, the proposed method works at a coarse level rather than at an individual transition level. Therefore, one requires significantly fewer applications to reduce the size of the TPN under analysis than those existing ones for TPNs. The use and benefits of CTPNs and reduction rules are illustrated by modeling and analyzing the response time of a command and control system to its external arriving messages.
specification models into a state transition graph made up of a set of states, a set of actions, and a succession relation associating states through actions [3] . This representation makes explicit such properties as deadlock and reachability [18] , and allows the automatic verification of ordering relationships among task execution times [10] .
However, for a complex or even midsize TPN, it is difficult to enumerate its reachable states, which is commonly referred to as a state-explosion problem. Sloan et al. developed several reduction rules for TPN analysis that work at an individual transition level [8] . These reduction rules help to reduce the complexity of TPN analysis to some extent. However, it is not a trivial work to automatically search the preconditions of applying these reduction rules for a complex TPN.
Modern complex time-dependent systems are often of module constructs. A modular system is a composition of components that interact with each other through connectors. In this paper, we introduce the concept of compositional time Petri nets (CTPNs). A CTPN is a modularized TPN, which is composed of components and connectors. A component is a coarse grained subnet of a TPN, and a connector is a simple TPN to describe the interaction among components. We propose a set of component-level reduction rules for TPNs. Each of the reduction rules transforms a TPN component to a small one while maintaining the net's external observable timing properties. The application of these rules will dramatically reduce the size of a CTPN. Meanwhile, because these rules work at a much coarser level than those developed by Sloan et al., fewer applications of our rules are needed to reduce the size of the TPN under consideration.
Many research achievements have been reported in reduction techniques for general Petri nets. In particular, a stepwise refinement and abstraction method [9] , [11] is developed for Petri nets, where the abstraction (reduction) technique can be used as a "divide-and-conquer" approach for the analysis of liveness, boundness, resource requirements, etc., for complex Petri nets. Our reduction rules are similar in spirit to their work [9] , [11] , in that we reduce the TPN components to the same form of simple Petri nets. The difference is that we reduce TPN components in terms of equivalent external observable timing properties. The analysis of TPN is clearly more challenging and important since it can model and reveal more characteristics of a discrete event system that evolves over time.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: Section II introduces the concept of CTPN models. Section III proposes a set of component-level reduction rules. Section IV illustrates the use and benefits of CTPNs and reduction rules by modeling and analyzing the response time of a command and control system to its external arriving message. Section V makes concluding remarks.
II. COMPOSITIONAL TIME PETRI NETS
CTPNs augment the basic Petri net model with timing constraints of TPNs and modular constructs. They follow the same transition firing rules as TPNs [5] . 
A. Petri Nets

B. Time Petri Nets
Time Petri nets (TPNs) were first introduced by Merlin and Farber [5] . In a TPN, two time values are defined for each transition EFT , and LFT , where EFT is the minimum time the transition must wait after it is enabled and before it is fired, i.e., its earliest firing time, and LFT the maximum time the transition can wait before firing if it is still enabled, i.e., its latest firing time. Times EFT and LFT are relative to the moment at which is enabled. Assume that has been enabled at global time . Even though it is continuously enabled, it cannot fire before EFT , and must fire before or at time LFT , unless it is disabled before firing due to another tran- the global firing time of the last transition in . We also denote by the set of all firing schedules of .
C. Compositional Time Petri Nets
The building blocks of a CTPN are components [14] . A component is a coarse grained subnet of a TPN. A CTPN model consists of two basic elements: components and connectors. Connectors are also represented by TPN models. The component TPN models describe the real-time behavior and communication interface of their corresponding components. The connectors specify how the components interact with each other. Both are used to form a composition model. All connectors are defined using only communication interfaces, which gives us the flexibility to change the design of individual components without a need to void the analysis of the entire system. Fig. 1 shows an example structure of CTPN models. It has three components-, and . Each component model has two parts: 1) communication ports (denoted graphically by half circles), including input ports (e.g., port8) and output ports (e.g., port9) and 2) a TPN that describes the time-dependent operational behavior of the component, i.e., it defines the semantics associated with the ports. The communication between a component and its environment is solely through the ports. A connector represents a channel of interaction between components. It is modeled by a simple TPN and defines the direction of message flow and delay in the channel. PORT is called a port of the component.
III. COMPONENT-LEVEL REDUCTION RULES
In this section, we present a set of component-level reduction rules for TPNs. These rules preserve the external observ-able timing properties of the components to be reduced, and are fundamentals to the analysis of CTPN models.
Following [8] . Based on this definition, when we reduce a component in a CTPN into a simple TPN using a timing property preserving transformation rule, the timing property, in terms of transition firing schedules, for the rest of the CTPN remains unchanged.
In the rest of this section, we will present several reduction rules that fuse together two or more transitions. We will give the proof that the first rule is timing property preserving in complete detail. In addition, the following interval arithmetic is used. Let and , with . Then we define to be the interval . In the special case where is a point interval, i.e., , and , we define to be the interval . The following definition is useful in the proofs of the following theorems.
Definition 3: We say that a port gets marked during a schedule if there is a prefix of such that is marked in the state .
Component-Level Reduction Rule 1:
Let be the TPN model of a system, and be the TPN model of component in the system, with port and port . The component has no enabled transition under the initial marking of . If 1) whenever port1 receives a token, port2 is guaranteed to receive a token in the future; 2) port1 cannot receive another token until port2 has received a token then we can reduce into by replacing with a simple net composed of two places: port1 and port2, and one transition: , such that 1) port port port port , while port and port remain unchanged; 2) SI SI port port , where SI port port is the time delay interval for the token moving from port1 to port2 (see Fig. 2 ).
Theorem 1:
The component-level reduction rule 1 is timing property preserving.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Component-Level Reduction Rule 2:
Let be the TPN model of system , and the TPN model of component of , with port port port , and port port . The component has no enabled transition under the initial marking of . If 1) whenever both port1 and port2 receive a token, port3 is guaranteed to receive a token in the future; 2) at least one of port1 and port2 cannot receive another token until port3 has received a token then we can reduce into by replacing with a simple net composed of three places: port1, port2 and port3, and one transition: , such that 1) port port port port port port , while port port and port remain unchanged; 2) SI SI port port port , where SI port port port is the time delay interval from two tokens arriving in port1 and port2 to a token reaching port3 (see Fig. 3 ). Theorem 2: The component-level reduction rule 2 is timing property preserving.
Proof: Since port port port1 and port2 share the same output transitions, which implies that only when both port1 and port2 get tokens can some transition in be enabled. Therefore, we can prove this theorem using the same method as that used in proving Theorem 1.
Reduction rule 2 can be extended to cases with more than two input ports.
Component-Level Reduction Rule 3:
Let be the TPN model of a system , and the TPN model of component of , with port and port port . The component has no enabled transition under the initial marking of . If 1) whenever port1 receives a token, one and only one of port2 and port3 is guaranteed to receive a token in the future; 2) port1 cannot receive another token until one of port2 and port3 has received a token then we can reduce into by replacing with a simple net composed of three places: port1, port2 and port3, and two transition: and , such that 1) port port port port port port , while port port and port remain unchanged; 2) SI SI port port , and SI SI port port (see Fig. 4 ). Theorem 3: The component-level reduction rule 3 is timing property preserving.
Proof Sketch: Let time Petri net be derived from by applying the component reduction rule 3. The general skeleton of the proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 1. We need to prove that and . We first prove . We will show that if , then . Because any such can be expressed as where , it suffices to show that for any where . We break our proof into several cases. Case 1) Port1 does not get marked during . Case 2) Port1 gets marked but neither port2 nor port3 gets marked during . From the proof of Theorem 1 we can conclude in the above two cases. Case 3) Port1 gets marked once and only once, and either port2 or port3 gets marked once and only once during . Suppose that port1 gets marked during . Then it follows from the proof of Theorem 1 that
. If the case is that port3 gets marked instead of port2 during , we symmetrically have the same conclusion. Case 4) General case. Suppose that port1 gets marked times, port2 gets marked times, and port3 gets marked times during . It follows from precondition (2) of this rule that either or . We have proven the cases in which , and . By the recursive use of the proofs for Case 2 and Case 3, we can prove that for any schedule in which takes any positive integral value. In the other direction, we may show using the method similar to that used in proving Theorem 1.
Reduction rule 3 can be extended to cases with more than two output ports. 5 ). Theorem 4: The component-level reduction rule 4 is timing property preserving.
Proof Sketch: Let time Petri net be derived from by applying the component reduction rule 4. The general skeleton of the proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 1. We need to prove both and . We first prove . We will show that if , then . Because any such can be expressed as where , it suffices to show that for any where . We break our proof into several cases: Case 1) Port1 doesn't get marked during . Case 2) Port1 gets marked but neither port2 nor port3 gets marked during . From the proof of Theorem 1 we can conclude in the above two cases. Case 3) Port1 gets marked once and only once, and either port2 or port3 gets marked during . Suppose that port2 gets marked during . Then it follows from the proof of Theorem 1 that
. If the case is that port3 gets marked instead of port2 during , we symmetrically have the same conclusion. Case 4) Port1 gets marked once and only once, and both port2 and port3 get marked during . Without loss of generality, we assume that port2 gets marked first and then port3 gets marked. Let be the shortest prefix of such that port1 gets marked during . This implies that is the shortest prefix of such that port2 gets marked during , and is the shortest prefix of such that port3 gets marked during . Then we write , where since we have assumed that port1 gets marked only once during .
Let be the time of state the time of , and the time of . Then, from preconditions (1) and (2) In the other direction, we can show using the method similar to that used in proving Theorem 1.
Reduction rule 4 can be extended to cases with more than two output ports. [see Fig. 6 ]. Theorem 5: The component-level reduction rule 5 is timing property preserving.
Component-Level Reduction
Proof: Since port port , port1 and port2 share the same output transitions, this implies that only when both port1 and port2 get tokens can some transition in be enabled. Therefore, we can prove this theorem by using the same method as that used in Theorem 1.
Reduction rule 5 can be extended to cases with more than two input ports and more than two output ports.
It should be noted that 1) The component-level reduction rules are purely developed based on the external observable input-output patterns of components. In other words, no matter how complex the internal structure of a component is, a reduction rule may be applied to reduce the component as long as the component matches the pattern of the rule. 2) A component may be analyzed by use of reachability analysis method [2] , [1] , [15] . This is a fundamental and most widely applied method for analyzing TPNs. If necessary and possible, we can use some individual transition level reduction rules given in [8] to reduce the component before reachability analysis. In case a component is very complicated, we can also use simulation or test to obtain the timing parameters required by its reduced net. In the next section, we illustrate how to build the CTPN model of a command and control system and apply the reduction rules to simplify the analysis of the response time of the system to its external arriving messages. 
IV. MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
A command and control (C2) system is a huge and complex integration of distributed hardware and software components. A C2 system is a typical real-time discrete event system. Excessive delays in execution of any of its functions may increase the damage probability, result in inefficient use of battle space, cause too many weapons to be assigned against the same target, and perhaps allow many targets to leak through a particular defense zone. This section illustrates the use of compositional TPNs to model and evaluate a tactic anti-air C2 system.
A typical structure of a tactic anti-air C2 system with two level command and control centers is shown in Fig. 7 , which consists of a first-level command center (indicated as C2 center) and two second-level command centers (indicated as subcenters). An instance of (C2 center, subcenter) may be (division, regiment) or (brigade, battalion). They are geographically dispersed due to environmental and survivability reasons, leading to the distributed architecture of a C2 organization.
The operation of the system is described as follows. S1)
The radar group periodically sends a message containing air target information to the two subcenters at a rate that causes no queue at any stage of information processing and communication of the system. S2)
The C2 center is composed of three seats: two intelligence seats and one decision-making seat. The behavior specification of this component is as follows. a) The two intelligence seats communicate with the decision-making seat through a common memory. b) The messages from two subcenters are first copied and dispatched to the two intelligence seats. The two actions together take one to two time units. c) The two intelligence seats then perform a situation assessment based on these messages to achieve a more precise situation picture, and then make a threatening assessment independently for each target and send the results to the decision-making seat. The first intelligence seat takes three to five time units to finish the two actions, and the second intelligence seat takes three to four time units. d) The decision-making seat works on a scheme of battle planning (taking five to six time units). The result is sent to the two subcenters (taking one to two time units).
S3)
The two subcenters have identical topology and timing properties. Each subcenter is composed of an intelligence seat and a decision-making seat. The behavior specification of this component is as follows.
a) The intelligence seat receives the message from its radar group and conducts target discrimination, identification, and tracking, and further conducts threatening assessment, then sends the result to the C2 center. It takes two to three time units. b) After receiving the scheme of battle planning from the C2 center, the subcenter fuses it with related data in the database again (taking one to two time units) so as to form a detailed scheme of weapon-to-target assignment (taking five to seven time units). Furthermore, the results are sent to fire units (taking one to two time units).
S4)
The two fire units have identical topology and timing properties. Their specification is as follows.
a) When the scheme of weapon-to-target assignment arrives from its subcenter, the unit first conducts engagement control. To this end, two computers concurrently compute shoot parameters (each computer taking two to four time units), and a third computer is responsible to fuse these parameters to form a complete engagement control command (taking two to three time units). b) Then, it conducts damage assessment (taking five to seven time units), and feeds back the assessment results to its corresponding subcenter in time (taking one to two time units).
In this case study, we focus on timing requirements on the system. These requirements include: R1)
The system reaction time, i.e., the time delay from an enemy intelligence message being received by any subcenter to a fire command agaisnt the enemy being issued by a corresponding fire unit, must be less than or equal to 45 time units.
R2)
Since the bottleneck for information processing is often located in component C2 center, the component is always asked to respond as soon as possible. This is captured by the requirement that the whole processing time for a group of messages from the two subcenters must be less than or equal to 22 time units. Fig. 8 shows the architecture of the CTPN model of the C2 system. The model has five components in total: a C2 center (C2C), two subcenters (SC1, SC2), and two fire units (FU1, FU2). Air-radar group is modeled as part of environment. Tables I and II show the legends of all nodes. Because of the similarity, we only describe the ports and transitions for C2 center, subcenter I, fire unit I and connections among them. Also assume that the two subcenters always obtain external inputs at the same time. Now, we turn to the internal representation of each component. First let us consider the C2 center. Its TPN model is shown in Fig. 9 . The messages from two subcenters are first copied and dispatched to the two intelligence seats (t101 fires). The two intelligence seats are responsible for performing information fusion and threatening assessment (t102 and t103 fire). The decision-making seat works on a scheme of battle planning (t104 fires). The result through ports C2C.S1 and C2C.S2 is sent to the two subcenters (T12 and T22 in two connectors fires). Note that the required synchronization among messages from the two subcenters has been modeled by transition t101, which does not fire until messages from both centers have been received. The intelligence seat receives the message from its radar group and conducts target discrimination, identification, and tracking (t105 fires), and further conducts threatening assessment (t106 fires), then sends the result to the C2 center (T11 in a connector fires). After receiving the scheme of battle planning from C2 center (SC1.RM is marked), the subcenter fuses it with related data in the database again so as to form a detailed scheme of weapon-to-target assignment (t107 fires). Furthermore, the results are sent to fire units (T13 in Fig. 8 fires) .
A. Compositional TPN Model of the System
As shown in Fig. 11 , the TPN model of fire unit 1 is composed of four transitions, five regular places and three ports. The information of weapon-to-target assignment from subcenter I is dispatched to the two computers (t108 fires), which concurrently compute shooting parameters (t109 and t110 fire). Then, the third computer performs result fusion (t111 fires). Then, the unit conducts damage assessment (t112 fires), and feeds back the assessment results to its corresponding subcenter in time (T14 in Fig. 8 fires) . 
B. Analysis of the C2 System
Applying the reduction rules involves timeliness analysis of TPNs. In [15] , we present a new effective reachability analysis technique for timeliness of TPN models. The technique is based on a concept called clock-stamped state class (CS-class), which not only groups system states into compact representation of state classes but also records the time, relative to the beginning of system execution, when such states are reached. In particular, a CS-class consists of three parts: 1) a marking that represents a logical state of the modeled system; 2) a "global" firing domain corresponding to firing intervals, whose values are counted relative to the beginning of the net's execution, of all firable transitions in the state class; and 3) a clock stamp that corresponds to the moment when the state class is reached with the clock value relative to the beginning of the execution. We developed an algorithm to construct the reachability tree of the TPN based on the CS-class concept. With the reachability tree generated based on CS-classes, we can straightforwardly compute the time span between any two reachable CS-classes, thus the end-to-end time delay in task execution.
It follows from specification (S1) that the system takes the same statistical property of time to process inputs arriving at different times. This enables us to consider only one set of inputs, which are generated by firing transition IN, to verify the system requirements. In this case, for any component to be reduced, no transitions in it will be enabled by the coming tokens at its input ports until the previous input tokens have reached its output ports, which makes our reduction rules applicable. Applying component-level reduction rules 5 and 4 to component C2 center and fire unit I results in Fig. 12(a) and (b) , respectively. Applying the enumerative analysis method [15] , we conclude SI SI and SI Thus, the requirement (R2) is verified. Now, the reduced TPN model of the system to check requirement (R1) is shown in Fig. 13 . Our goal is to compute the time delay that TPN runs from the initial state to the first marking in which places SYS.F1 and SYS.F2 are marked. Based on Fig. 13 , reachability analysis shows that it takes 31 to 42 time units for the system to reach that state in which SYS.F1 and SYS.F2 are marked. This implies that requirement (R1) is satisfied. Notice that in this example, we first reduced three components (C2C, FU1, and FU2) into three simple TPNs, so as to use a much simpler but equivalent model to analyze the system's timing property. The efficiency of the reduction depends on the complexity of the net inside the components to be reduced. In other words, the more complex a component, the more important the reduction.
Note that the reduction rules [8] work on individual transitions or places, and may not be applicable in some cases. For example, no such reduction rule is applicable for any reduction effort to component C2C.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Compositional time Petri nets (CTPNs) augment the basic Petri net model with timing constraints of time Petri nets (TPNs) and a modular construct. CTPNs allow the decomposition of a complex model into several simple submodels, or components, and thus ease the modeling of complex real-time systems. To conquer the analysis complexity of TPNs, this paper also presented a set of component-level reduction rules for TPNs. Each of these reduction rules transforms a TPN component to a simple TPN while maintaining the net's external observable timing properties. To automate the analysis of CTPNs, we implemented a software tool named CTPNa&v. The tool is written in C code and developed with UIM/X (professional edition), and presently runs on Solaris.
Introduction of time into a transition or place increases both the modeling power and the complexity of the net analysis. As a consequence, the reduction rules presented in this paper are only applicable to safe CTPNs. However, we believe that CTPN models and reduction rules are still helpful in timing property verification of complex real-time systems, as shown in Section IV. For an unsafe bounded CTPN, we can transform it to a safe CTPN by building the submodels of queues for possible buffers [17] . The cost for this transformation is the increase of the TPN size of component models. Suppose that port1 gets marked times and port2 gets marked times during . It follows from precondition (2) of this rule that either or . We have proven the cases in which , and . By the recursive use of the proofs for Case 2 and Case 3, we can prove that for any schedule in which takes any positive integral value. Now we prove . Similarly, we will show that for any holds where . We also break our proof in several cases.
Case 1) Port1 does not get marked during .
Because only when port1 gets marked can fire, so in this case, we can conclude that never fires during . Therefore, , which implies that because port port . Case 2) Port1 gets marked but port2 doesn't during .
The assumption that port2 doesn't get marked implies that never fires during . So, as true in Case 1, we also have . Case 3) Port2 gets marked once and only once during .
Let be the shortest prefix of such that port1 gets marked during , which implies that , and be the shortest prefix of such that port2 gets marked during . Then, we can write , where since we have assumed that port2 gets marked only once during , which implies that only fires once. Let be the time of and the time of . Then, from the structure of the reduced net, we know 
